

may have any concerns. (s) An administration granted abroad, and the assignees or trustees appointed under the bankrupt or insolvent laws of another state, are not allowed to have any authority here, in order that the interests of the state and of its citizens, may be protected. But no such reason can exist for refusing to recognize the appointment of a guardian of a foreign infant, made under the laws of the state to which he belongs. An infant being incompetent to contract, or to incur debts for any thing more than mere necessities, the irresistible presumption is, that he can have no creditors beyond the immediate sphere of his domicile; and consequently, there can be no probability, that any of our citizens would be at all prejudiced by allowing to a foreign infant, by his foreign guardian, the same kind of right of removing his effects beyond the reach of our laws, which has been so freely conceded to a foreign adult.

But if it were held to be necessary to have the moveables belonging to a foreign infant, placed in the hands of a guardian appointed here, it would be in effect, to determine that his property should be withheld from him during the whole term of his infancy; or at least, that it should be exposed to the great risk and expense of a foreign management, where the extent of his wants could not be correctly estimated, and the seasonable application of the profits of his estate to his necessary calls could not be made. In short, the recognition of the appointment of a guardian to a foreign infant, under the law of his domicile, is a courtesy which may be safely and readily reciprocated among nations, without the slightest injury to any one, and with the greatest benefit to infant owners every where. Therefore, the reason, the justice, and the necessity of such cases, obviously require such a general and mutual recognition; and that the authority of such an agent should be every where regarded as having the same extent as the authority of an adult owner himself, in so far as it may be necessary to sue for, collect, and remove his personal estate, and the rents and profits of his lands, without contravening the law of the state where such land may be situated, as to the right and title to it. (t)

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(s) Vattel, b. 2, c. 7, s. 85; Kames' Pri. Eq. b. 3, c. 8, s. 1; *Ex parte Otto Lewis*, 1 Ves. 298.—(t) *Arglasse v. Muschamp*, 1 Vern. 75; *Kildare v. Eustace*, 1 Vern. 419; *Ex parte Otto Lewis*, 1 Ves. 298; *Ex parte Annandale*, Amb. 80; *Cranstown v. Johnston*, 3 Ves. 170; S. C. 5 Ves. 277. In the matter of the Duchess of Chandois, 1 Scho. & Lefr. 301; *Cartwright v. Pettus*, 2 Chan. Ca. 214.